We examine a newsvendor problem with two agents: a requesting agent that observes private demand information, and an oversight agent that must determine how to allocate resources upon receiving a bid from the requesting agent. Because the two agents have different cost structures, the requesting agent tends to bid higher than the amount that is actually needed. As a result, the allocating agent needs to adaptively learn how to interpret the bids and estimate the requesting agent's biases. Learning must occur as quickly as possible, because each suboptimal resource allocation incurs an economic cost. We present a mathematical model that casts the problem as a Markov decision process with unknown transition probabilities. We then perform a simulation study comparing four different techniques for optimal learning of transition probabilities. The best technique is shown to be a knowledge gradient algorithm, based on a one-period look-ahead approach.
INTRODUCTION
Consider a game in which two players with newsvendor payoffs, a requesting agent and an oversight agent, have to coordinate to meet an uncertain demand. This arrangement occurs in collaborative settings, where members of a common organization have to make a joint resource allocation decision to satisfy consumer demand. More often than not, however, the adverse effects of over-or underestimating this demand differ for the two parties, a fact that translates into different underage and overage cost structures between them. Consider the following scenarios:
• The marketing branch of a business requests a budget for an upcoming advertising campaign. Underfunding the project may result in an ineffective campaign, whereas overfunding draws monetary resources away from other important projects within the organization.
• A project manager within a consulting firm coordinates with other managers to assemble a team for a given
project. An understaffed project may be subject to unnecessary delays and missed deadlines, while overstaffing projects can create coordination problems and force the company to take on fewer projects.
• The IT department of a company requests a timeframe for completing a programming assignment. The IT department faces a penalty for not finishing on time, but an estimate that is too long will unduly stall the company's objectives.
The requesting agent is usually endowed with access to better information about the demand, and has an incentive to engage in opportunistic behaviour, submitting misleading allocation requests that exaggerate the difference between the optimal allocation quantities for the two agents. However, the oversight agent can, through repeated play and observation, learn the requesting agent's behavioral patterns using standard Bayesian updating techniques, eventually gaining the ability to account for the bias in the requests. The oversight agent will also have a strong interest in learning this biasing behaviour quickly, as underage and overage costs accumulate over time.
From the point of view of the oversight agent, the problem can be modeled using a Markov decision process (see Puterman 1994 for a definitive overview of classical MDPs) with the added dimension of unknown transition probabilities. The state of the MDP is an aggregate summary of the past history of the game (for example, the last three requests submitted). The set of actions is the set of possible allocation quantities, and the reward process is given by the newsvendor payoff of the oversight agent. However, the probability of moving from one state to another
Generation of the request
Let c u r and c o r be the underage and overage costs of the requesting agent. In the nth play of the game, the requesting agent's cost function for an allocation quantityx n is the standard newsvendor payoff:
The requesting agent minimizes costs by ordering at the critical quartile (Arrow, Harris, and Marschak 1951) From the point of view of the oversight agent, the optimal allocation quantity givenD n is
Because the oversight agent prefers to allocate less than the requesting agent asks for, the latter may adopt a strategy of employing a bias or padding term b when making requests. Thus, the actual order quantity submitted by the requesting agent at time n is
In practice, the oversight agent does not see the observationD n when making a decision, and only has access to the request Q n . Then, (1) can be rewritten in terms of b n as
We can express the cost incurred by the oversight agent in the nth play, given the decision x n ∈ X , is expressed in terms of the differential
that was allocated in relation to the request Q n . The newsvendor cost for the oversight agent now depends on the bias, and is given by
With the representation in (4), we can restate the oversight agent's decision problem in terms of choosing the differential x n rather than the allocation quantityx n itself. The request Q n is now contained in the decision variable. By considering the differential (how much to over-or underfund the request) rather than the request itself, the bias becomes the only uncertain quantity in the problem. We assume that the bias b n is drawn from a finite set {b 1 , ..., b K } where b K > ... > b 1 . The distribution of b n depends on the degree of cooperation between agents. If the requesting agent expects full cooperation from the oversight agent, b n will tend to be small; if the requesting agent believes that the oversight agent is likely to underfund the request, b n will be more likely to be large. The requesting agent can infer the oversight agent's responsiveness from an aggregate expression of the past history of the moves made in the game up to time n, represented by a scalar
where h n is a discretizing function mapping the previously observed costs into some finite set. For a given cost history s at time n, the bias b n is a discrete random variable with probability mass function given by
If S is the number of possible cost histories, the biases can be completely characterized by an S × K matrix called r, where element r s,k is as given above. The bias process (b n ) ¥ n=0 is thus Markovian with respect to the sigma-algebra F n generated by the first n moves made by both agents.
Markov decision process model
Suppose that the matrix r is known to the oversight agent. This assumption is relaxed in Section 3, where we assume that the oversight agent holds imperfect beliefs about the biasing behaviour that can be improved through learning. We model the decision problem of the oversight agent using a Markov decision process.
The decision made by the oversight agent at time n depends on the history s n of the game as given in (5). We thus refer to s n as the physical state of the MDP. The decision itself is a quantity x n , as defined in (3). We denote by X the set of all possible differentials available to the oversight agent, and assume that X is finite (e.g. a discretization of an interval). Once a decision is made, the next state is determined by a function s n+1 = S M (s n , x n , b n ) where S M is determined by (5). The quantity b n will not become known to the oversight agent until time n + 1. However, we index it by n to reflect the fact that it is set by the requesting agent at time n.
The oversight agent must choose an allocation policy p to minimize the total discounted cost,
where X p,n is a decision rule associated with the policy p that maps the state s n to an action X p,n (s n ) ∈ X . The allocation policy that solves (6) can be found by solving Bellman's equation (see Puterman 1994) using value iteration, policy iteration, or linear programming methods.
A learning model for transition probabilities
Suppose now that the oversight agent does not know the biasing beliefs r exactly. Following the precedent of Silver (1963) and Martin (1967) , we use Dirichlet priors to capture the oversight agent's uncertainty about r. Given a set of unknown transition probabilities p 1 , ..., p K for K outcomes and a vector of parameters a = (a 1 , ..., a K ) with all a k ≥ 0, the Dirichlet density is given by
The notation G refers to the gamma function. The resulting marginal estimate of each individual probability p k is given by (DeGroot 1970)
A samplep ∼ Dir (a) can be generated (Gelman et al. 2004 ) by first drawing
.., r s,K ) denote the biasing behaviour for a given cost history. This vector is unknown to the oversight agent, but we assume that our beliefs about r s follow a Dirichlet distribution with parameter vector a 0 s = a 0 s,1 , ..., a 0 s,K , denoted by r s ∼ Dir a 0 s . We assume that r s and r s ′ are independent for s = s ′ . The collection a 0 = a 0 s | s is referred to as the knowledge state, to distinguish it from the physical state of the MDP.
Every time we choose an action x under a cost history s, we observe a random transition to a new state. The observation W n+1 s is determined using the true, unknown bias probabilities r s , and thus provides information that can be used to update our beliefs. The random transition can be viewed as a multinomial random variable with 1 trial (the single random transition) and K different categories (the possible values of the bias). The pmf of the random observation is given by P W n+1 s = e k = r s,k , where e k is a vector of zeros with 1 at position k. Note that the random transition depends on the bias b n that was already chosen by the requesting agent before the action x n is selected. Thus, W n+1 s depends on s, but not on the choice of action out of s. Each random transition changes our beliefs about the bias probabilities. Let a n s denote our beliefs about r s at time n. If, at time n, the physical state is s n , the updating equations for our beliefs are given by
Because the vectors r s are independent, observing a random transition out of a state with history s only changes our beliefs about r s . This change is made by incrementing the corresponding component of a n s by 1. A derivation of (7) can be found in DeGroot (1970) .
In fact, given a n and the game history s, we can compute the conditional distribution of a n+1 s . Despite the complexity of the Dirichlet density, this conditional distribution has a simple form that will allow us to present a computable learning policy in Section 3. Proposition 1 gives this result.
Proposition 1. Suppose that, at time n, the physical state of the MDP is s. The conditional distribution of a n+1
s given a n is discrete, with pmf
where P n denotes a conditional probability given a n . 
Proof
The notation IE n denotes a conditional expectation given a n .
LEARNING POLICIES
We describe three heuristics for optimal learning of transition probabilities in an MDP. The first is the pure exploitation policy, which follows a greedy strategy and does not consider the learning component of the problem when making decisions. The second is the local bandit approximation policy of Duff and Barto (1996) , which attempts to reduce the problem to a multi-armed bandit problem. Finally, we apply the knowledge gradient concept of Gupta and Miescke (1996) and Frazier, Powell, and Dayanik (2008) to this setting.
Value iteration and pure exploitation
With the addition of learning into the problem, the policy p in (6) is a set of decision rules X p,n mapping a physical state s n and a knowledge state a n to a point in the action space X . We will now give a simple example of such a learning policy. Suppose that we have made n measurements and stopped learning entirely. We will continue to make transitions and collect rewards after time n, but we will not be allowed to use these transitions to update our beliefs, so a n ′ = a n for all n ′ > n. Then, our best guess of the optimal policy is the policy produced by the classic value iteration algorithm (an overview of this and other classic MDP algorithms is available in Puterman 1994), assuming that the true transition probabilities are given by the time-n beliefs a n . This procedure, which we refer to as a n -value iteration, initializes v 0 (s) = 0 for all possible physical states s, and iterates
for all s until max s v m (s) − v m−1 (s) is within some specified tolerance level, then returns the policy p n that chooses actions by solving (8) using the final approximation v pn obtained from the procedure. If desired, value iteration can be replaced by any classic MDP algorithm. The pure exploitation policy is defined to be the policy that makes a decision according to the policy p n obtained from a n -value iteration, but then proceeds to update the beliefs using (7), and uses a n+1 -value iteration to recompute the policy that seems to be the best under the new beliefs. The pure exploitation decision rule is
Local bandit approximation
The local bandit approximation (LBA) policy by Duff and Barto (1996) removes the physical state from the problem, and uses techniques from the multi-armed bandit literature to make decisions. Suppose that we are at time n. We can use a n -value iteration to obtain the policy p n . If we fix this policy, the MDP reduces to a Markov chain Y n whose transition probabilities are given by
When we make a random transition out of state s, we incur a cost of the form
We can let
be the number of transitions required for this Markov chain to reach state s ′ for the first time, given that it starts in state s. The quantities
represent the expected discounted cost incurred and time elapsed up to time t s,s ′ , and can be computed using first-transition analysis on Y n . Then, given that the MDP is in state s n , define
If we choose action x out of state s n , we will transition to state S M (s n , x, b k ) with a certain probability, after which we will follow the policy p n . When we do so, we will make t S M (s n ,x,b k ),s n transitions before we return to the state s n . Thus, (10) represents the expected total discounted cost per unit of expected discounted time that we receive during the sojourn between visits to s n . Equation (10) is analogous to the reward-per-unit-time representation of Gittins indices for multi-armed bandits. Gittins indices were first developed by Gittins and Jones (1974) , and this particular representation is discussed e.g. by Duff (1995) . Thus, g x (s n , a n ) is like a Gittins index for the action x, with the sojourn costs and times determined by policy p n after the first transition. The LBA policy then makes the decision with the smallest cost-per-unit-time,
If we were maximizing a reward instead of minimizing a cost, we would take the argmax in (11) rather than the argmin. At each time step, LBA views the process as stateless; the downstream rewards are incorporated into the calculation of (10), and the problem reduces to a choice between |X | different reward processes, each of which leads back to the present location. To compute Gittins indices for all processes, we must first compute p n , then solve 2 · |X | systems of S × S linear equations.
The knowledge gradient policy
We apply the knowledge gradient concept, studied by Gupta and Miescke (1996) and Frazier, Powell, and Dayanik (2008) originally for the ranking and selection problem, to the setting of MDPs with unknown transition probabilities. In , this concept is stated as "choosing the measurement that would be optimal if it were the last chance to learn." We assume that we are in state s n at time n, and the (n + 1)st transition will be the last one to impact our beliefs. That is, a n ′ = a n+1 for n ′ > n + 1. Then, we need to choose one action at time n, and we will switch to the policy p n+1 starting at time n + 1.
Suppose that we make a decision x at time n. By Proposition 1, we know that a n+1 s n is discrete with K possible values, and a n+1 s ′ is known for all s ′ = s. Let a n+1,k s n = a n s n + e k denote the kth possible value of a n+1 s n . By Proposition 1, the conditional probability of this outcome given a n is r n s n ,k . For each outcome k = 1, ..., K, we can run a n+1,k -value iteration to obtain a vector v p k n+1 representing the infinitehorizon value of being in each state, given that we see outcome k in the random transition out of s n at time n. We can true probabilities, though the decisions themselves are based on the beliefs a n . Our performance measure for a given problem is the difference in discounted long-run reward collected by two policies on that problem, averaged over 10 4 sample paths. These sample paths are divided into groups of 500 to obtain approximately normal estimates of the performance measure, which can then be used to obtain standard errors. It is necessary to generate many sample paths in order to make a decisive comparison of two policies. However, this substantially increases the computation time, and requires us to use small problems for our numerical experiments. If one were to use a policy in practice, one would only run it once, and the computation time would be closer to the numbers in Table 1 . We considered four policies: the KG policy from (14), pure exploitation policy from (9), the LBA policy from (11), and the Value of Information Exploration (VIE) policy of Dearden, Friedman, and Andre (1999) . The VIE policy approximates the expectation of the true value function by taking Monte Carlo samples from the prior distribution. For every Monte Carlo sample, we then solve a value iteration problem. To ensure a fair comparison, we set the number of Monte Carlo samples in VIE equal to the number of value iteration problems solved by KG. Thus, both VIE and KG required approximately the same computational effort. We ran every policy for 30 iterations.
In our experiments, the history function h n from (5) was defined in such a way as to discretize the cost incurred by the requesting agent in the most recent game, . Two types of problems were generated. In the truth-from-prior problems, the true transition probabilities r are generated from the prior a 0 , as assumed by the model. This represents a setting where the prior beliefs are reasonably accurate, and provide useful starting information. The initial priors themselves were chosen in such a way as to reflect the intuitive biasing behaviour explained above. In the equal-prior problems, all elements of a 0 are set to 1, and the true probabilities r are chosen to reflect the intuitive behaviour. This represents a setting where we have no prior belief about which transitions are more likely. We generated 15 MDPs of each type. Each MDP had five states and four actions. The small problem size is dictated by the necessity of running each policy many times to obtain an accurate comparison.
Figures 1(a) and 1(b) show the simulation results for both problem types. The bars represent the difference in discounted long-run reward collected by the two policies in each comparison. Bars above zero represent problems where KG outperformed a competing policy. For example, "KG-Exp: 8/15" means that the KG policy outperformed pure exploitation on 8 out of 15 problems. The dotted lines represent ±2 times the average standard error across all comparisons.
We see that KG is generally competitive against pure exploitation. KG loses on seven truth-from-prior problems, but only one of these losses is statistically significant. Similarly, of the eight problems where KG wins, two are statistically significant. In the equal-prior case, KG has more of an edge, achieving a statistically significant margin of victory on six out of fifteen problems, while never losing by a statistically significant amount. Pure exploitation yields good performance on truth-from-prior problems because they consider a setting in which the prior beliefs are accurate on average. Thus, the action that seems to be the best based on the current beliefs usually is the best. However, in the equal-prior case, the performance of pure exploitation suffers noticeably.
KG also performs competitively against LBA. While KG suffers four statistically significant losses in the truthfrom-prior case, it achieves a statistically significant margin of victory on seven problems. On the equal-prior problems, KG outperforms LBA by a significant margin nine times, while being (barely) significantly outperformed only once.
The VIE policy is outperformed by KG in all of the experiments, almost always by a significant margin. This is especially noteworthy since both KG and VIE solve the same number of value iteration problems in every time step. However, KG consistently yields significantly better performance with the same computational effort.
We conclude that KG is competitive against a variety of learning policies under both types of priors. If the prior reveals enough information, a simple policy like pure exploitation tends to achieve good results. However, KG seems to have an especial advantage in a setting where the prior reveals little information about the problem. It is important to note that this is precisely the type of problem where it is important to learn well and quickly.
CONCLUSION
We have presented a stochastic model for the two-agent newsvendor problem from the point of view of the oversight agent. The problem is modeled using a Markov decision process in which the transition probabilities represent the biasing behaviour of the requesting agent. The oversight agent has the ability to adaptively learn this behaviour using a Bayesian model with Dirichlet priors and multinomial observations. We have proposed a policy for optimal learning in this setting, based on the knowledge gradient concept from the ranking and selection literature. This work is the first to apply this concept to a problem with a physical state. The KG policy is intuitive and easy to implement.
The computational complexity of the policy depends on the size of the physical state space, but does not grow over time. Like the Value of Information Exploration policy of Dearden et al. (1999) , the KG policy solves a number of value iteration problems in order to choose an action. However, experimental results suggest that, when VIE and KG solve the same number of value iteration problems, KG consistently yields significantly better performance with the same computational effort. Our experiments also show that KG is competitive against other policies such as the local bandit approximation policy of Duff and Barto (1996) .
While computational cost remains an issue in very large problems, one can use fast-starting for a large speed boost in all but the first iteration. With this modification, the algorithm can potentially handle problems with large state spaces, as long as the action space is not too large. Additional methods for decreasing running time are an interesting subject for future work. However, we believe that the KG approach as we have presented it offers an interesting new perspective on the problem of learning on an MDP with unknown transition probabilities.
